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E A ST  T IM O R : T O W A R D  SETTIN G  C A P T IV E S FR EE?
I.
PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY
East Timor is legally a Portuguese colony in the last stages of its self determination process 
illegally occupied these 21 years by Indonesia.
To the Maubere people it is a nation occupied and annexed by an alien, hostile, abusive 
colonial/imperial power. (This is true even of the vast majority of the 45% odd who did not 
favour immediate independence in 1975.)
To Jakarta E. Timor is an oil rich territory whose independence or autonomy would pose 
grave moral hazard throughout the outer islands and - by being likely to practice human rights 
and also centre left governance - to be a threat to the stability of elitist, Javanese, military neo­
corporatism in Java itself.
Historically E. Timor (before the Portuguese came in early 1500's) was sometimes a sultanate, 
sometimes part of an all Timor sultanate, sometimes de fac to  semi tributary to a Javanese 
sultanate (not necessarily the Jakarta one). During four and a half centuries as a Portuguese 
colony it grew apart from the Dutch ruled half of island, whatever previous commonalities 
may have been. Upland E. Timor was not fully governed by anybody (probably still is not). 
Coast was pre-European trade and sea power based sultanates' concern and Portugal's during 
imperial high noon. Later it was a quiet backwater.
Urban Timorese are relatively Westernised in dress, language, religion, vocabulary. This is 
less true in rural and especially upland areas. If data are correct, the practice of Catholicism 
has exploded upward and use (in defiance of Indonesian law) of Portuguese risen sharply since 
the invasion/occupation because these are perceived as national people's symbols.
Just before independence the broad political picture (broad - the details are infinitely complex 
as Maubere appear to be very fractionalising when free to be albeit this may be appearance not 
reality - first real political action run up to election under colonialism and exile politics do 
facilitate spawning of an infinite number of parties most of which turn out to be nearer tea 
parties than political when given a real test):
a. Independence Now (Fretilin) -55%
b. Free Association With Portugal -30+%
c. Phased Federation With Indonesia -15-%
d. Immediate Integration Into Unitary Indonesia -1%
After the election Fretilin - which rhetorically was then Marxist-Leninist as were all major 
Portuguese Colonial Movements - somewhat unwisely declared unilateral independence and 
suppressed resistance by b-c-d and Portuguese. In this context it needs to be realised Portugal 
botched the Angola and Mozambique transitions and had no part in that of Guinea (Bissau) 
where the remnant garrisons de fac to  flew out under a truce. That Mozambique looked tidy 
was result of absence of significant black pro-Portuguese or separatist sentiment, of relative 
lack of cold war strategic concern and of Frelimo backing up departing governor and his 
demob happy men against (settler) "Dragons of Death". Even so there was next to no official 
level handover and utter administrative chaos. Even had Fretilin sought to work with 
Portuguese and assuage "b" (free association with Portugal) group, Indonesian provocateurs 
via "c", "d" would have ensured chaos for Jakarta to sort out. (Part of fighting was in fact 
Indonesian provocateur organised. How much is very unclear - not all.)
Indonesia moved promptly (4 to 6 weeks) once it was clear to all Portugal had no intention of 
sending forces to regain control. Its army-navy-air force occupied Dili in hours and lowlands 
in days. A year later an 'Assembly' purportedly 'traditional' Maubere (who had never had a 
territorial wide council before the National Assembly with Fretilin majority they'd just elected) 
but Indonesian organised (including selection of 'traditional' leaders) gave a ringing (whether 
loud and clear or hollow is disputed) 99% vote for immediate full integration into a unitary 
Indonesia and continued military presence to protect from 'banditry'.
The UN has never recognised the invasion/annexation but annual resolutions of condemnation 
(pushed by Lusophone world plus Tanzania with erratic Dutch and Australian support and 
passive EU, to accommodate Portugal, and OAU, to back Tanzania-Mozambique-Angola- 
Guinea (B)-Cabo Verde-Sao Tome e Principle, agreement) long ago fell into desuetude.
The UN has de temps en temps tried to broker talks. As Portugal wants to save face, to have 
a decent looking referendum, to condemn invasion and - perhaps - to protect Maubere; 
Maubere want at least autonomy and choice; Indonesia wants to tidy up and dress up by 
procuring international baptism and laying on of hands to what it has done these talks have 
gone nowhere.
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T H E  FACE O F TH E AGGRESSO R
Post Suharto Indonesia is centralised, militarised, repressive, fearful, elitist, systematically 
corrupt (but as part of centralised control; 'freelancing' is 'taken out' when identified) and 
nasty. It is also moderately and increasingly efficient. The reductions in absolute poverty and 
rises in health, education, nutrition are real and are public policy to demobilise discontent and 
to raise productivity - modem "bread and circuses" to critics.
Control is all pervasive. For international image (and perhaps providing conduits for secret 
police penetration) reasons, some trade union, opposition party, independent press and 
religious organisations which are not overtly nor actually state emanations are allowed. But if 
they threaten to be independent and genuinely critical, they are either suppressed or suddenly 
have contrived, state run, 'special' elections to put in a quiet dummy leadership (as has 
happened in a large church and the main opposition political party over past year).
This is the pretty side of the regime. It came to power by a coup - purportedly against a 
Communist Coup. W hether the CPI planned a coup and against whom is not clear. Probably 
yes - but against hard right military and intelligence figures e.g. Suharto, Ali Alitas - almost 
certainly not against President Suharto. In fact there was only one actual coup - the Army's. 
They did not install the clearly anti Communist, civilian Vice President as head of a civilian 
government. In fact they killed 500,000 out of perhaps 200,000 CPI members and 
interned/imprisoned perhaps 2,000,000 more (most gradually released - only a handful now in 
prison 40 plus years on). The Red Peril theme has been run in a way making M cCarthy look 
amateur and moderate and the Old South Africa understated.
Externally Indonesia has been a bullying aggressor and a friend of useful tyrants. It has 
claimed - and secured by a palpably fraudulent election - West Irian where it has settled a 
Javanese majority. It has spoken of East Irian (borderline-New Guinea=Irian so in principle E. 
Irian could be a geographic term) and more ominously of Irian Irridenta (i.e. PNG). It backed 
off when Australia and Singapore made clear PNG would not go down undefended by A's 
troops/fleet and by Singapore's jets over Jakarta.
The offshore islands of Singapore and the interior borders of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei were 
invaded. When the Gurkhas, the Australian and Royal Navies and the SAS were whistled up, 
Indonesia backed down.
Outer island revolts were crushed - blood and iron not mediation was the answer. (This in 
fairness was a Sukarno era practice too. The Javanese majority, on a land scarce tiny island
II.
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amid less populated, more oil-mineral - forest endowed ones, strongly believe in centralisation 
and majority, i.e. Javanese, rule. How much better democratic semi and totally illegal 
opponents in Java are on this count is unclear. Perhaps.)
The international spokesperson is Foreign Minister Ali Alitas (formerly of 'intelligence' and by 
repute personally an interrogator and torturer). He has been the hidden (not so very) hand 
behind giving Burmese junta a place as Associate in ASEAN. Characteristically he has backed 
down for the time being because he feared something. President Ramos said there was no way 
he - or he believed his successor - could accept a regime which made Marcos look like a 
democrat and a choir boy. Blocking ASEAN internal progress was more of a risk than 
delaying adding Burma. (Malaysia also seems to have muttered about the style of the Ne Win 
gang and getting ASEAN a bad image and Thailand became tepid. Viet Nam and Brunei held 
their peace so only Singapore was left with Ali in hard line junta approval society camp.)
With that record an 85% vote in E. Timor against Indonesia in 1975 is hardly surprising and 
even the rest (bar 1%) wanted phased, federated entry. What reasonable human being, given 
the choice, would not?!
HI.
JACKBOOTS AND JAM  POTS: INDONESIA MARCHES IN
The Indonesian invasion initially stalled in the deep rural areas and especially the hills. The 
Maubere (or at least Fretilin's backers plus some others) were willing to die for their people. 
While Indonesia has confined the hill revolt, it still exists as do urban riots/demonstrations 
often turned into killing grounds as in 1991 at Dili cemetery.
The initial war was to crush, kill, wipe out. Whether the subsequent stage marked by 
provocation and murder by police at initially peaceful (if from an Indonesian perspective 
vehemently hostile and de facto  seditious) are a) part of a systematic terror policy; b) ad hoc 
"pour encourager les autres"; c) panicky field personnel or d) a bit of each is unclear. Practice 
back in Indonesia suggests "d".
Indonesia correctly asserts that it has spent far more in E. Timor in 40 years than Portugal in 
450. There are more schools, clinics, irrigation works, extension officers, food distributions, 
etc. There is also a death toll (war, famine, epidemic) of perhaps 200,000 of a perhaps 
600,000-700,000 initial populaiion and an exile toll of 100,000 plus perhaps 150,000 settlers 
moved in to help hold the locals down. The government financing of Protestant church entry 
is interesting. Basically the state is pro-Islamic. But Protestant Javanese churches with real
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Javanese pastors of real poor Javanese (settler) congregations are useful to throw dust in 
Indonesian Council of Churches, Asian Council of Churches, WCC eyes. The claims of 
discrimination against Protestants by a neo-inquisitorial Roman Catholic church seem to trace 
back to 'intelligence' or to bemused Javanese pastors whose settlers on confiscated land are 
indeed harassed, but not because they are Protestant nor because the expelled peasants are 
Catholic.
The national languages (Tetum and Portuguese) are virtually suppressed. There is no 
provincial assembly (not unique to ET). There is no freedom of association - except to a 
limited and perilous extent under the wings of the Church. (Bishop Belo is subversive by an 
Indonesian definition. He believes in the rights of his people as a people and therefore of 
space in which to exercise them - and to speak them in languages of their own choice. 
Suharto model governance has no space for that.)
IV. 
CANDLES TO SEARCHLIGHTS? GLOBALISING RESISTANCE?
After the initial international furor died out E. Timor became a forgotten war in a far away, 
insignificant comer of the world where a few geo-politically and economically irrelevant 
people (not incidentally successfully 'red washed' by Alitas and his ilk) clashed with a large, 
strategic, oil rich, big market state. Australia was a partial exception - presumably because it 
was closer, because Ramos-Horta (ex H.E. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information Jose 
Ramos-Horta of the short lived Republic) and many other exiles lived there, partly because 
Indonesia as a land hungry aggressor state with a big army bothers Australia (and especially 
the two conservative parties Liberal/Country) and partly because the conservative parties in 
Australia have racist supporters who can relatively less dangerously be satisfied by criticising 
Jakarta (or Beijing) than by domestic chauvinism.
What interest there was became largely under an individual human rights rubric, which from 
perspective of a suppressed people was better than silence but deeply unsatisfactory. (The 
South Africa external support evolved through a similar phase; by late 1950's it was no longer 
perceived simply or even primarily as individual human rights.)
A handful of external groups did seek to keep the case of the Maubere people visible - the 
(UK) Catholic Institute of International Relations is an example. Even in their cases hope and 
a feeling of duty to bear witness to the truth even if only by keeping a lanthorn about a candle 
in a typhoon was dominant, not hope of immediate or even foreseeable results.
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In the past five years the context has changed:
1. the massacre at Dili cemetery took place before the eyes and cameras of the international 
press and millions saw Sharpeville style 'handling' of a peaceful memorial march;
2. steady reports of Western Arms (notably UK Hawker trainers fitted with guns by 
Indonesia to serve as ground control fire platforms) came to be believed and to mobilise 
the core anti arms sale campaigners;
3. the UN's human rights side began to take E. Timor more seriously and to call for open 
talks without pre conditions treating Ramos-Horta's group as de facto  an interested 
negotiating party and Bishop Belo as the mediator of choice (not Indonesia's!);
4. In 1994 Philippine NGO's held a solidarity conference with the Maubere. Indonesia 
believed 'a word to the wise' at the M alacanang would stop that nonsense. Instead it 
radicalised Philippine NGO thinking, created broad hostility (nationalist - "We are not 
Indonesia's 64th Province") to Jakarta, caused massive Philippine and broader publicity 
and backed Philippine government (Ramos) into a corner and thus into defying them.
a. Indonesia - gradually escalating - backed demands for ban with:
i. seizing half of Philippine trawler fleet;
ii. break-up of ASEAN sub-regional (the one centred on Mindanao) investment 
forum;
iii. suspension of $400 million in Indonesian committed joint project investment;
iv. threat to have Philippines' excluded from ASEAN;
v. threat not just to halt help in MNLF (Nur Misuami's insurgentsj/Malacanang talks 
but to back upping of violence by MNLF.
b. President Ramos was startled - he did not realise how paranoid Indonesia is on the 
'Maubere Question' - and appalled:
i. he agreed to ban foreign attendance (not by any means fully enforced) and to make 
clear conference views were not official policy;
ii. he (presumably) procured parallel statement from UP Chancellor;
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iii. but said his Constitution guaranteed free speech and assembly and having spent 
1986-1995 rebuilding rule of constitutional law he would not, could not, had no 
willingness to violate it (including not ordering UP to throw meeting off campus).
c. That leaves a Philippine NGO broad base for Maubere, a Philippine press/intellectual 
deep resentment at Jakarta, a much broader awareness of E. Timor with increased 
doubts Indonesia talk of Ramos-Horta/Belo as Portuguese colonial puppets is true;
5. the Asian Council of Churches and WCC in their 1995/6 dialogue/workshop shifted from 
treating E. Timor as an individual human rights violation case toward viewing it as the 
suppression of a people and their rights;
6. at the 1996 Bangkok 'Summit' of NGO’s prior to Asia-Pacific summit. Asian NGO's, 
including Indonesian, spoke out on East Timor and the Maubere people's agony;
7. Indonesia in 1996 acted to avert the rise of a genuine opposition by removing Founding 
President Sukarno's daughter as head of the main 'licensed/tame' opposition party by 
holding a fraudulent special party congress and used basically peaceful mass reaction as an 
excuse for violence, sedition indictments and trying to relaunch 'red tsunami' rhetoric - 
with corrosive international credibility results. (Similar actions against a Protestant church 
in 94/95 had helped sensitise WCC to the Regime's nature);
8. By its not very disguised opposition to Burma's entry into ASEAN tied to junta's treatment 
of 80% majority party and the political and literal heir of the Bogyoke U. Aung San 
(founder of modem Burma), the Philippines restaked out its willingness to say decent 
governance matters and to look Indonesia in the eye. Alitas blinked - agreed 'no hurry' i.e. 
no willingness to rerun confrontation;
9. The Nobel Prize mantle descended on Bishop Belo and Ramos-Horta with a ringing 
citation not only of Indonesia's sins in E. Timor but an equally ringing endorsement of Belo 
and Ramo-Horta as men of good will and peace as well as of the struggle for justice;
10. In response the Vatican issued its first unequivocable endorsement of Bishop Belo's 
struggle for justice for his people as a people;
11. Indonesia both choked and vituperated. Significantly its spin doctors chose virtually to 
ignore the Belo half of prize. (Suharto promptly went to E. Timor to dedicate another 
development project. He sat beside the Bishop on a helicopter but - pointedly - did not 
mention Nobel or reasons behind it; youth and evangelisation were his themes.) Alitas
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side-stepped Belo but denounced Ramos-Horta as a "political adventurer". The 
implication is clear - they now fear to denounce Bishop Belo because they believe it would 
be internationally, in Indonesia and in E. Timor counterproductive.
The ground has shifted. E. Timor is visible. Indonesia is on the defensive. It has made 
itself look like SE Asian Iraq and fears that point will be made and while it can still count on 
ASEAN quiet support (even Philippines recognises annexation and given Indonesia's ability to 
launch Muslim insurgencies Maubere can not expect activist state backing from any likely 
Malacanang occupant) believes new Australian government fears and despises them and could 
turn nasty playing the Indonesian criticism card as acceptable "racism with a human face". 
(That is not quite a fair reading of motivation - then PM Fraser led Commonwealth push 
against RSA and he was a Liberal/Country PM and, whatever else they are, Boers are white 
and most ANCers black.)
The present issue is where next? How can momentum be sustained? And to what possible 
resolution - doubtless far short of the New Jerusalem but at least giving a chance of peace, life 
and wholeness for the Maubere as people and as a people.
V.
WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN NEGOTIATION
My own view is that possible resolution might be:
a. de facto confederation with E. Timor 'provincial government’ having power over:
i. land ownership/residence (to avoid swamping with forced immigrants)
ii. language rights/use
iii. substantial own revenue (if share of customs/indirect taxes then to be kept in Dili not 
remitted, claimed back)
iv. separate public service with ET public service commission
v. elected governor and assembly (ET to set electoral law, registration, voter 
qualifications except permanent resident Indonesians can vote)
vi. some share (e.g. 50%) of all offshore oil/gas revenues (broadly defined) in ET zone to 
ET direct from companies;
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vii. environmental/pollution law in respect to vi. and as to forests etc. in ET
b. together with de fac to  external monitors/guarantors:
i. panel of facilitating states (e.g. Australia, Netherlands, Portugal, Brazil,
SA/Mozambique) to mediate on Jakarta/Dili differences, to have ongoing relationship 
(including as core of direct to Dili aid consideration).
This is de fac to  confederation with de fac to  international surveillance. It could meet Maubere 
needs. Because it is de fac to  it would be seen as a lesser evil to Indonesian regime if growing 
international outcry about invasion/annexation/destruction of a people was perceived to 
threaten economic and security links.
The Maubere are not traditionally a very united people so whether they could cohere around 
this type of negotiated solution I have no idea. I do not object to Ramos-Horta's plan (see 
Annexure) in principle; but I see no way Indonesia could be pressured enough to agree 
because in Jakarta view W. Irian, South Moluccas, parts of Sumatra, perhaps Borneo and even 
Bali would follow. (Except for WI, I doubt the peoples in question want more than 
federalism in a decent human rights context.)
W hat I think just and practicable is of no great import. That a moderately well informed 
analyst can see something potentially viable may be of some use in guiding supporters of 
Maubere people. It is no good telling their leaders any of us can mobilise the pressure to get 
them independence however just it may be.
VI. 
CANDLE TO TORCH TO CELEBRATORY BONFIRE: HOW?
The case for solidarity with the Maubere people is compelling. Events over the past five years 
have opened up space and altered climate to do more than hold a shield around a guttering 
candle in a raging midnight typhoon. How? A set of possible elements follow.
But first it is prudent to reflect briefly on the (very close) analogue to the Suharto Regime - 
Saddam's Iraq and on the most tenacious, gradually snowballing and ultimately successful 
global churchpeoples' support effort - South Africa.
It is not necessary to accept Northern motivations in respect to Saddam Hussein's Iraq to 
recognise it as evil. Like Indonesia it invaded and annexed its neighbour, set up a military 
regime slightly papered over with a few collaborateurs and waged terror against the people.
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In both cases this flowed from a history of aggressive expansionism and in both was related in 
part to greed for more hydrocarbon reserves by the rulers of an already oil rich state. In both 
there has been a genuine - economic advance and political demobilisation focused - drive to 
reduce absolute poverty and build toward universal access to primary education, health 
services and pure water. There are divergences - unlike Iraq, Indonesia backs down when 
resistance to and disapproval of expansionist endeavours raise costs, because it fears world 
opinion and becoming regular CNN a theme topic. Therefore its poverty reduction/basic 
services drive has continued and, indeed, operates in occupied E. Timor parallel to repression. 
Second, Indonesia, unlike neo-totalitarian Iraq, views limited but not nil space for religious 
groups (which like Iraq it manipulates to serve its ends), independent print publications, trade 
unions, etc. to be the most useful policy. Not all criticism is barred - only that which the 
regime fears could build up to a threat to its stability (especially when Suharto goes - well after 
the millennium) - is forbidden. The space for autonomy and dissent fluctuates and 
(deliberately) is kept unclear as a means to encouraging 'speak mildly and survive' attitudes.
As a result Ali Alitas has an easier brief than his present parallel Tariq Azia (or his parallel of 
the 1930's, Count Ciano of Mussolini's 'New Empire'). In both bases international law is 
against the aggressor. Kuwait was and is a sovereign state (whatever its relationship with 
Baghdad of the Caliphs) and E. Timor was and is a Portuguese colony in the last stages of self 
determination - at international law and as affirmed by the United Nations as well as by 
Portugal. The issue is not whether one actually favours re-establishment of Portuguese 
suzerainty, but that without the free consent of the Maubere people and of Portugal the 
Indonesian occupation is an undeniable violation of international law in general and the 
Charter of the United Nations in particular. No possible "domestic affairs" defence exists.
The South African case above all underlines the need for determination never to give up, 
always to plod (if nothing more is possible) on and to make use of opportunities to publicise 
and broaden the support base. (e.g. Some North American churches and voluntary bodies -
e.g. World University Service - were campaigning at grassroots on aspects of apartheid by the 
mid-1950's so that by 1994 their track record was that of a working lifetime. Dating the 
Maubere people's agony to 1975 suggests one should be prepared for - not accept - two more 
decades of solidarity in struggle.) Because church action/representation alone will not be 
enough - the walls of Jakarta may fall to trumpets but the chorus must include the 
governmental and economic - Christian action needs to be inclusive (not least to preempt 
Jakarta's predictable efforts to cloak the occupation in the mantle of a Jihad against the 
'intrusive' cross) and to utilise every event that sheds discredit on the Suharto Regime or adds 
legitimacy to the parallel foci of struggle - the national church symbolised and led by Bishop 
Belo; the overseas informational, demonstrational and diplomatic movement led by Shr. 
Ramos-Horta and the internal struggle by demonstration and by continued (if isolated and 
small) armed Maubere resistance to the occupation of their people's lands.
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P e o p l e 's  N o t  O n l y  P e r s o n s ' R ig h t s
One weakness of support groups and efforts has been to perceive the E. Timor 'problem ' as 
one of individuals' human rights violations. The systemic nature of these violations (which 
are more pronounced in, but by no means unique to, E. Timor as opposed to Indonesia) is 
frequently not clearly recognised. Further E. Timor is treated as if it were 'internal' to 
Indonesia. It is not and therefore the rights 'question' is not merely cases and systems of 
violation of individuals' rights but also (and in the context of) the total suppression of a 
people's rights (including that of self determination whether as independent or confederated 
with either Indonesia or Portugal - the only options conceivably enjoying significant present 
Maubere support). It is important that those groups which see this point clearly act to 
broaden the understanding of others with whom they network by providing background 
material, discourse and dialogue with exiled Maubere.
F a r e w e l l  T o  A r m s ?
A clear pressure point is arms and multi purpose or arms supporting technology and
materials sales to Indonesia - more precisely working for an embargo on them. Hawker 
planes and also armoured cars and artillery are of significant importance to Indonesia in 
respect to the occupation as are fast patrol boats. (Larger naval vessels and other military 
aircraft are more relevant to the Paracel and Spratly Islands disputes and - potentially - to 
blackmailing its neighbours.) Beyond that Indonesia has a flourishing arms and aircraft 
industry as well as shipyard capacity.
Duel purpose technology to backup the 'information' (secret and military police control) 
system, to wage anti guerilla war and to substitute domestic naval, aeronautical and heavy 
arms production capacity for imports should be a parallel target. Most com puter technology 
and advanced electronic items, a broad range of machine tools and civil aircraft fall in this 
category. Loss of access to them would cripple the state security apparatus and also the vital 
mining, hydrocarbons and heavy manufacturing sectors.
It is important not to expect too much choking off of flows (as opposed to publicity and 
forcing governments to rethink and to seek to justify such sales) in the short run. Japan, South 
Africa, probably Israel, Pakistan, possibly India and certainly China will be hard cases.
A n  A r c h i p e l a g i c  R e a c h ?
E. Timor is not lawfully part of Indonesia. But it is under Indonesian rule and cannot be seen 
outside the Indonesian context.
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Indonesians do suffer under systemic abridgement of basic human rights and a large number of 
case of infringement of individuals rights. Indonesians do organise within the space open to 
them - and frequently go beyond it into suppression (by fraudulent new leadership installation, 
arrests and/or police/army terrorism masquerading as "law and order"). Many of these groups 
- judging by what they said at the 1995 Asian 'People's Summit' - are sympathetic to the E. 
Timorese peoples' (and probably people's) struggles.
What they can do requires exploration with them. This is particularly true in respect to 
Indonesian churches. These are licensed and subject both to revocation of licenses and to 
imposed leadership changes. The Indonesian Council of Churches is a Council in at least semi 
captivity. It has made the first Constantinian bargain - accepting state benign approval and 
recognition of legitimacy (not Establishment, the second bargain which is actually post- 
Constantine) in return for broad acceptance of the regime and its overall goals and policies. In 
particular the state has prevented Islamic (also licensed) groups from mobilising against 
Churches (at least so long as their evangelisation was not seen as provoking unmanageable 
tensions). The recent anti-Christian statements of (officially recognised) Islamic bodies are 
almost certainly a Regime warning to the Churches to reduce their criticisms and tone them 
down. In this context the fairly consistent - if rather low key - raising of individual human 
rights cases in E. Timor is an act of more bravery than it may seem. So too Protestant pastors 
in E. Timor do feel and experience hostility by Maubere people, which the Regime tells them is 
Catholic aggression. As most are Indonesians serving (poor) Javanese settler colonists 
brought in by the Regime to hold the Maubere down (often on confiscated land) hostility is 
real and communication with Maubere or the Catholic church near nil. Such communication 
leading to dialogue and understanding is something Indonesian churches might reasonably be 
pressed to encourage and facilitate.
A  R e g io n a l  B a s e
The E. Timorese need a base in Asia - for information, dialogue, diplomacy and politics. For 
geographic and cultural reasons Australia is far from ideal. (Australia has a water border with 
E. Timor but one several thousand kilometres from Sydney or Canberra.)
There is a real potential for creating such a base in the Philippines (Manila). Philippine ngo 
support built up for 1994 conference continues including some NCCP members and leaders. 
The Philippines is a largely Catholic country (like E. Timor) with a substantial body of lay and 
ordained Catholics in support on inter church cooperation. (The Cardinal Archbishop Cebu is 
more disposed to such actions - and sympathetic to the Maubere - than the Cardinal 
Archbishop of Manila appears to be.) In 1996 the Catholic Bishops Conference has protested 
the refusal of a visa to Shr. Ramos-Horta to attend the pre-APEC people's organisation 
conference. (See Annexure.)
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*The government would not suppress Filipino activity or support groups. It would be 
surprising if it banned Maubere church or church related figures attendance at NCCP, 
NCCP/Catholic, AACC WCC, or Peace and Justice sponsored dialogues and conferences.
Low key entry by Maubere less prominent than Ramos-Horta has usually been possible - 
residence permits may or may not be. President Ramos recent answer to a query whether 
Ramos-Horta would be given a visa to come to the Philippines during Suharto's pending visit 
was breathtaking (even if visa at time of visit/APEC summit was subsequently denied) - he 
said he would "cross that bridge when I come to it". Ramos is perfectly aware Indonesia will 
take that as a deadly insult and a threat and could have cancelled the Suharto visit. The 
interesting statement in Annexed story is that of Ramos ally/populist politician positioning 
himself for 1998 presidential run, speaker de Venecia who virtually urges Ramos-Horta to 
come, but later. The fact APEC People's Forum asked R-H to address opening session 
underlines continuing domestic/regional people's organisation support for Maubere - especially 
as main focus of meeting is on trade. Whether Ramos successor will be as ready to stand up 
to Jakarta as the ramrod backboned West Pointer is not clear but after 1994 the Indonesian 
Regime has few friends in the Philippines.
T o w a r d  G l o b a l  N e t w o r k in g
There are networks of Maubere supporting groups but - except in W estern Europe - relatively 
thin and - apparently - limited communication ones. This is an area WCC, Peace and Justice 
and the better informed national network leaders (e.g. CIIR) should seek to strengthen.
For the avoidance of doubt outreach should not be limited to Church or Christian affiliated 
groups. All groups of goodwill (e.g. human rights, arms trade) should be approached with a 
view to networking and common action. At present potential leadership in Europe, North 
America and the Philippines probably will be largely from Christian oriented groups. This may 
not necessarily be true elsewhere in the world (albeit ACC may be the most appropriate 
catalyst in Asia either alone or jointly with ACHRO).
" A  P e o p l e  D e p r i v e d "
A strength of the broad anti-apartheid movement was the volume of well written, factually 
grounded, well produced publications it produced. To date there is no comparable flow on E. 
Timor and what there is something (e.g. by CIIR, the UN and the W CC/ACC 1995 
Consultation Report, it is not very widely available. It is doubtful, for example, that most 
network groups (much less members) have seen Ramos-Horta's 1992 proposals for a mediated 
settlement (summary by R-H. appended).
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No one publication will 'solve' the information and publicity deficit. However, WCC, CIIR,
CA might usefully consider commissioning a serious, in depth study analogous to UNICEF's 
Children On The Front Line. That document (over a quarter of a million copies in three 
editions and three languages were distributed) was deadly for the apartheid regime. It began 
with pre-independence history and early independence goals in Southern Africa and the human 
and economic costs of war writ in deaths, social facility destruction, GDP loss. (The last 
edition included South African social conditions and data.) It was carefully researched and 
reasoned and, if anything, was understated rather than rhetorical. Despite - or because? - of 
that, the message that came across to many readers was "Botha Butchers Babies" (words quite 
deliberately not in the document). South Africa was furious but - interestingly - decided the 
case made was too well supported to make attack profitable and remained silent even while 
doing its bureaucratic best to hamper UNICEF operations in the region (and bursting out in 
wrath against the organisation and the first listed author - "That evil man , Professor Green" in 
private to Europeans it thought sympathetic).
Clearly there are differences between the South African periphery and "war to make Southern 
Africa safe and profitable for apartheid" and Indonesia's occupation and annexation of E.
Timor and suppression of the Maubere people. But an analogous approach to COTFL's might 
well be a way to broaden knowledge and outreach. More political discussion - and appending 
of key documents - would be possible as the proposed sponsors are not bound by the 'keep out 
of politics' rules relevant to UNICEF (albeit in the case COTFL saving infants and children's 
lives was both squarely within UNICEFs mandate and strategically political because the 
apartheid regime had made it so).
The study would need to be well and carefully done. Indonesia will look for errors and 
rhetorical political partisanship and use them to seek to demolish any such venture. To collect 
the material will require quiet contacts (especially to get vignette case studies and actual 
people's words - as used effectively in COTFL). A full time researcher for six months plus, an 
editor for two to three and an expert editorial/advisory group would be needed plus 
networking to make an initial printing of at least 5,000 necessary. (The present writer is 
willing to put time where his mouth is - certainly on editorial/advisory group and - if his 
Institute could be paid'to 'loan' him - probably as editor or co/editor.)
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V l l .
"BECAUSE WE HAVE GONE ON TRYING"
The above suggestions are not, nor intended to be, a complete strategy but notes toward one.
The chances of massive short term breakthroughs are low and of ultimate failure not 
inconsiderable.
In answer to that criticism, the response of a UN agency field representative to his 
headquarters' warning that the Great Southern African dearth of 1992-93 would kill hundreds 
of thousands or worse and that a low profile to avoid blame for failure would be prudent is 
apposite - "1 agree it may be too late to avert massive death tolls. But if we do not even make 
the attempt history will not forgive us." Nor should it have - national, regional, NGO bilateral 
and international agency efforts did avert mass deaths (except where war prevented relief in 
Angola and M ozambique) so that over 90% (perhaps 95%) of the 3,000,000 human lives at 
risk were saved.
- Reginald Herbold Green
Distribution:
Ian Linden, CIIR
Paul Spray, Christian Aid
Susie Smith, Oxfam
Rob van Drimmelen, WCC
The Rev. Dr. Konrad Raiser, WCC
The Rev. Fely Carilho, ACC
Reinhild Traitler
William S. Ellis
Maitet Diokno, Freedom From Debt Coalition 
The Rev. Gavin Ashenden 
The Rev. Andrew Robinson 
The Rev. Rob Esdaile
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Only Portugal and Indonesia Can Settle the Case
r  I H\  16 - X
' ' . ' • i
T A K A R T A  —  The Ease 
J  Tim or issue is not as far away 
from a solution as it m ight ap--*' 
pear. Portugal and Indonesia 
cam e close to an internationally 
acceptable settlem ent a few 
years ago. They could still 
achieve a sim ilar breakthrough, 
provided Lisbon is prepared to 
be reasonable.
The issue arose in the mid- 
1970s when East T im or was be­
ing decolonized. A civil war 
erupted as the Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East 
T im or, known by its Portuguese 
acronym  as Fretilin, moved to 
elim inate its rivals through vi­
olence. The colonial power, 
Portugal, could neither restore 
order nor put the decolonization 
process back on course. It 
sim ply abandoned the territory.
Subsequently, in 1976, an 
overw helm ing majority o f the 
East T im orese people, in a
B y lr a w a n  Abidin
•political exercise based on their 
traditions, chose to declare in­
dependence through integration 
with Indonesia as the repub lic’s 
27th province.
Years after the decolon iza­
tion process was com pleted, 
Portugal claim ed that it was still 
the adm inistrative pow er, d e ­
spite the fact that the deco l­
onization process it started had 
been com pleted. East T im or is 
now enjoying much m ore p ro ­
gress than it ever experienced in 
four centuries o f  Portuguese 
rule, and there is no turning 
back the hands o f  time.
This is the issue that Portugal 
and Indonesia are trying to  re ­
solve through talks under the 
auspices o f  the UN secretary- 
general. He first suggested re ­
sum ption o f diplom atic re la ­
tions, but Lisbon ruled that out.
• He then suggested the opening 
o f  interest sections in the tw o 
capitals. Indonesia accented the 
proposal; Portugal rejected it.
In 1987, the UN secretary- 
general suggested a com pre­
hensive, just and internationally 
acceptable solution: He w ould 
form  a delegation of five o r  six 
countries that would go to  In­
donesia on a fact-finding m is­
sion to East Tim or. They w ould 
m ake a thorough investigation 
o f  the situation in East T im or 
and subm it a report to the sec­
retary-general that w ould con ­
tain no recom m endations. He 
w ould then subm it the report to 
the UN G eneral Assem bly.
T he assem bly w ould be 
called into special session. A 
free, fair and open debate w ould 
take p lace on the report. Indone­
sia and its supporters w ould a r­
gue that decolonization had 
taken place in East T im or, that 
this reality  should be accepted  
and that the issue should be re ­
m oved from  the UN agenda. 
Portugal - a n d . its suppo rte rs ' 
w ould m arshal their argum ents 
against that position. A t the end 
. o f  the debate, a  vote w ould be 
taken, ■ and both • sides w ould  
have to abide by its re su lt 
to Indonesia accepted the p ro- 
. posal. Portugal turned it dow n. 
In  1991 there was an attem pt to 
revive the plan. Again Portugal 
b locked it. *.
W hen Foreign M inister Ali 
A latas went to the eighth round 
o f  the UN-sponsored talks w ith 
Portugal earlier this year, he was 
hoping to hear something m o re  
positive from Lisbon. Instead, 
Portugal rehashed a proposal 
that it had previously rejected 
and gave it an unreasonable
twist, making it impossible for 
Indonesia to accept.
Lisbon said it would agree to 
the creation o f interest sections 
in the tw o capitals if Jakarta 
released East Tim orese political 
prisoners. B u t/th e  “ political 
prisoners”  in question w ere 
convicted o f com m on crim es 
before Indonesian courts. R e­
leasing them  would underm ine 
Indonesia’s justice system .
Then the Portuguese foreign 
minister expressed his w ish to 
travel to Indonesia to m eet Jose 
Xanana Gusmao, an East 
Tim orese convicted of com m on 
crimes as the leader o f  a  sep ­
aratist m ovem ent. This w as-an 
affront to Indonesia. A  foreign 
m inister o f  a country should go 
to another country to talk  w ith 
its governm ent, not to talk solely 
with a  prisoner. O f course, Mr. 
Alatas rejected the suggestion.
Nonetheless, Indonesia con­
tinues to hope that the U N - 
sponsored talks on East Timor 
will soon make progress. A new  
government is now in place in 
Portugal, one that is at . least 
. looking for ways to deal with 
the problem instead o f  simply 
rejecting proposals.':.! .
M eanw hile, the all-inclusive 
dialogue between ;-.the y E ast 
Tim orese factions will g o  qn 
trying to build  goodwill. B ut that 
is all it can  do. The solution can 
come only  when the govern­
ments o f  Portugal and Indonesia 
' negotiate w ith an equal m easure 
o f sincerity, instead o f one try ­
ing to outsm art the other. ' ' -J
The writer, currently am bas­
sador to Greece, is a  fo rm e r  
director o f  information in the 
Indonesian Foreign M inistry. 
He contribu ted  this com m ent to 
the H era ld  Tribune.
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E. Timor ruffles Suharto '
Cool reception for 
Nobel laureate
By Ian MacKenzie 
Reuters
DILI, East Timor — Indonesian 
President Suharto snubbed Nobel 
P eace Prize winner Bishop Carlos Fi- 
lipe Ximenes Belo on Tuesday during 
a brief visit to troubled East Timor.
T h e  In d o n es ia n  le a d e r  tw ic e  
shook hands with Belo during a cere­
mony in the territory’s  capital o f Dili 
but did not speak to him.
But Belo, an outspoken advocate of 
Timorese rights, was congratulated by 
some of Suharto’s cabinet ministers 
and armed forces chief Gen. Feisal 
Tanjung. Asked if Suharto’s coolness 
surprised him, Belo said, “I am sur­
prised that I am congratulated by for­
eign people, but not from Indonesia.”
Indonesia invaded East Timor in 
December 1975 and annexed it the 
following July in a move the United 
Nations has refused to recognize. Belo 
has served as peace-maker during 
sometimes brutal confrontations be­
tween the military and local activists.
Indonesia reacted with surprise to 
the Nobel announcement on Friday, 
tersely acknowledging the award to 
Belo but denouncing the joint award to 
Australia-based Jose Ramos-Horta, 
whom Foreign Minister Ali Alatas de­
scribed as a “political adventurer."
Suharto and Belo sat side by side 
during a helicopter ride to allow Su­
harto to view a 90-foot statue of Jesus 
Christ erected on a headland over­
looking Dili Bay. But Belo later said 
they discussed neither the Nobel 
award nor East Timor’s political fu­
ture. He said Suharto asked him  
about the church and his work 
among the youth in East Timor.
By Uucfitar Zakaris. AP
Few words: Indonesian President Suharto, left, shakes hands with East Timor 
Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo during a  visit Tuesday to Dii, East Timor’s  capital. *
In his Dili speech, Suharto spoke 
of the need for unity and stressed re­
ligious tolerance. He did not mention 
the Nobel award.
He spoke in mainly-Catholic East 
Timor at a  time when Christian 
churches have com e under attack on 
the m ost populous island of Java.
The leader of the largest Muslim 
grou p  in  In d o n esia  on T u esd ay  
blam ed the attacks on religious intol­
erance. “The community should be 
re-oriented by its leaders towards tol­
erance and mutual understanding 
with other religions, to accept other 
religions and to be at hom e with plu­
ralism in religion,” Abdurrahman 
Wahid, head o f the 30-million strong  
Nahdlatul Ulam a, said.
Suharto was m aking his third visit 
to East Timor sin ce  coming to pow er  
30 years ago. H e inaugurated six  pub­
lic works projects covering highway, < 
road and irrigation construction.
In Sydney, where the other Nobel • 
laureate lives in self-imposed exile, Ra- j 
mos-Horta described the president's 
visit as a publicity stunt. Asked if he 
agreed with Indonesian criticism, he 
added, “They look at Ramos-Horta as 
their enemy, but for me (he is) a  hu­
man being and we must respect th at”
East Timor: To Peaceful Self-Determination in Three Stages
SYDNEY —  Despite the op­pression and suffering in the 
form er Portuguese colony of 
East Tim or since Indonesia’s 
invasion nearly 21 years ago, I 
and others leading the m ove­
m ent that is resisting the In­
donesian occupation continue 
to seek a  peaceful settlem ent.
W e have tried to convince the 
governm ent o f President Su­
harto in Jakarta that its in­
transigence on East T im or will 
only prolong conflict and in­
stability in the region.
A w are of Indonesia’s in­
terests and the difficulties o f 
abruptly reversing an illegal oc­
cupation, the N ational C ouncil 
o f M aubere R esistance, the um ­
brella organization of the p ro­
independence forces, w hich I 
represent abroad, has proposed 
a three-phase peace plan.
It is intended to assist the UN 
secretary-general, who has a 
m andate from the U nited N a­
tions to find a solution to the 
East Tim or conflict. The plan is 
in line with statem ents by East 
T im orese Catholic Bishop C ar­
los Belo. It could assist Jakarta 
in extricating itself from the 
East T im or quagm ire.
Phase 1 (one to two years):
Talks between Indonesia and 
Portugal under the auspices of 
the UN secretary-general, with 
East Tim orese participation, to 
end aim ed activities in East 
Timor; release political prison­
ers;, reduce Indonesian military 
personnel and civil servants; re­
move arm aments; expand activ­
ities by the International C om ­
mittee o f the Red Cross; cany  
out a population census; provide 
entry to UN specialized agencies 
working in the fields o f public 
health, developm ent and envi­
ronmental protection; restore all 
basic human rights; remove re­
By Jose Ranios-IIorta
strictions on the Portuguese and 
Tetum languages; establish an 
independent human rights com ­
mission; appoint a resident re­
presentative o f the UN secret­
ary-general in East Tim or.
■ In return, the East T im orese 
resistance forces w ould halt all 
hostilities against Indonesia and 
all acts that em barrass Jakarta.
Phase 2 (five years from  the 
end  o f  Phase 1):
This would be a transition 
stage of autonom y in which East 
Tim orese would govern them ­
selves democratically through 
their local institutions.
T here w ould be a U N -super-
a n /vised election for h A ssem bly ./ 
Only East T im orese w ould .be 
eligible to vote and be e lec ted .■; 
T he A ssem bly w ould elect an j
t  the com m and of the governor. 
-  m .l ^  ii Phase 2 could be extended by
m utual consent betw een In­
donesia and the East T im orese 
population expressing its views 
through a referendum . .. . . 
East T im orese governor. t/tUi -M.-, . Phase 3: A self-determ ina- 
Pow ers o f the A ssem bly , tion referendum , under UN su-
w ould include legislation on i n - ! pervision, w ould be held within
vestm ent, property, im m igra- /.'a year o f the start of this phase, 
tion and foreign trade, u  u-a The population could choose
D uring Phase 2, all rem ain- betw een free association with
ing Indonesian troops-w ou ld  Indonesia, integration into In-
w ithdraw , and there w ould be a donesia or independence,
further reduction in the num ber ' I w rote personally to Mr. 
o f Indonesian civil servants/!,''Suharto in M arch 1994 to give 
The territory w ould have: no - him  an assurance that we would 
arm y o f its ow n, but a police scrupulously respect any choice
force, organized by the U nited freely m ade by the m ajority of
N ations, would be placed under the East T im orese people.
/»:•* k 'VM f.; .
W e have tried repeatedly to 
open a dialogue with the In­
donesian governm ent on our 
peace plan. So far we have been 
ignored. N onetheless, we re­
main open to talks. ■»
It is tim e for Indonesia to 
show courage and start a con­
structive and sincere dialogue 
to resolve the East T im or con­
flict and redress past mistake^.
The w riter was av arded the 
1996 N obel Peace Prize on F ri­
day, with B ishop C arlos Belo, 
fo r  "w ork tow ard a ju s t and  
peacefu l solution" in Ea$t 
Timor. H e contributed this com ­
m ent to the In ternational H er­
ald Tribune.
,T /i>. A prize shames the world into action
The Nobel award should end international complacency at the plight of East Timor, says Ian Linden
*■•k-
B y awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Dishop Belo and Jose Ramos 
Horta, two key campaigners 
for justice in East Timor, the 
Nobel Comm ittee has sent a 
„ strong signal that it is time to 
end the long betrayal of East 
Timor. But, as Indonesia’s out­
raged response illustrated, it is 
not going to change hearts and 
minds in the Suharto regime.
In contrast to the destruction 
visited on Iraq after it annexed 
Kuwait, Indonesia invaded East 
Timor in D ecem ber 1975 with 
impunity. Since then, and in the 
face of 10 UN resolutions call­
ing for withdrawal and uphold­
ing East T im orese rights to 
self-determination, the lndone- 
: sian military has presided over 
the death by extra-judicial exe­
cution, war, famine and disease 
of some 200,000 East Timorese 
people, i
U ntil now Indonesia  has 
assumed that time is on its 
1 side, and that guerrillas lighting 
for independence could be 
wiped out. Encouraging some 
100,000 Javanese settlers into 
East Timor's tiny population of 
about 850,000 has consolidated 
Indonesia’s position.
The Vatican appointed C ar­
los Filipe X im enes Belo as 
apostolic adm inistrator of Dili, 
the East Tim orese capital, in 
May 1983 in the hope that he 
would not rock the boat. It was 
a miscalculation.
W ith grow ing skill the 
youthfu l Belo w alked the 
tightrope of the East Timorese 
resistance’s guerrilla war and 
Indonesian  occupation . He 
inherited a church that p ro­
vided both solace and a cul­
tural space for the East Timo­
rese. T h e re  was no doub t 
where his heart lay: in 1989 
Belo wrote to the UN secre­
tary-general calling for a UN- 
supervised referendum  on self- 
determ ination. He warned that 
East T im or was “dying as a 
people and as a nation”. There 
was no reply.
It look the massacre of some 
200 East T im orese civilians by 
Indonesian forces at the Santa 
Cruz cem etery in Dili in 1991 
to help turn the tide of world 
opinion. The British journalist 
Max Stahl caught the slaughter 
on video and the film was 
broadcast worldwide to in ter­
national outcry.
In 1994 the John  Pilger/ 
David M unro docum entary  
Death o f  a Nation was shown on 
Central TV. A response line was 
jam m ed with callers until 3am 
the next morning. Tim or had 
ceased to be a small unknown 
island in the Indonesian archi­
pelago. It was a popular cause.
Against this background, the 
UN established talks between 
the old colonial power, Portu­
gal, and Indonesia. A fter sev­
eral rounds w ithout much 
progress, the parties agreed to 
all-inclusive talks. The first 
m eeting took place in June 
1995. Despite m anipulation by 
the Indonesian governm ent, 
the wide range of Tim orese 
represented reached a consen­
sus statem ent, in large part due 
to bridge-building by Bishop 
Belo.
International pressure and 
reliction to repression within 
Indonesia arc now beginning to 
make inroads. Indonesia’s for­
eign minister, Ali Alatas, has 
called the Tim or issue "gravel 
in Indonesia's shoe” hobbling 
his country’s ambitions on the 
world stage.
The low-level guerrilla war 
has a corrosive Vietnam-slyle 
effect with secret night flights 
taking the Indonesian war dead
back to Jakarta. Although the 
nationalist guerrilla  leader 
X anana Gusmao was captured 
in 1992, in prison he threatens 
to assum e the m antle of a 
M andela.
T he E u ropean  U n io n : 
adopted a Common Position on 
East T im or in January 1996, 
providing a basis for concerted 
action in defence of h u m an 1 
rights and in favour of a peace 
process. In June the E uropean 
Parliament, called on all EU 
m em ber states “to halt all mil­
itary assistance and all arms 
sales to Indonesia”.
These developm ents do not 
sit easily with the public posi­
tion of the Foreign Office. 
Indonesia is an Asian tiger 
economy in the making, seen as 
a potentially vast m arket of 
194 million people and a strate­
gic linchpin in South-east Asia. 
It is a profligate purchaser of 
arms and concluded $201m of 
arms sales with Britain between 
1988 and 1992. In June 1993 
British Aerospace was awarded 
a £500m contract for 24 Hawk 
fighter/trainers. ,
Those visiting the Foreign 
Office to advocate an arms 
embargo know the refrain by 
heart: concern about human 
rights ... impracticable to mon­
itor regularly ... no evidence 
that Hawk aircraft are used for 
repression ... Indonesian gov­
ernm ent assu rances... need to 
consult our EU partners. But 
without the stick of an arms 
em bargo and the carro t of 
enhanced international status 
for Indonesia, the future for 
East T im or looks grim. , '
The N obel Prize adds three 
things to the picture. F irst, it 
enhances Bishop B clo’s c re ­
dentials as a m ediator, a role 
that the UN w ants him  to 
play. B elo 's m ediation in the
E ast T im orese dialogue h a s , 
already  com plem en ted  UN 
involvement.
Second, it will strengthen 
. the hand of Ramos H orta, the 
exiled leader of the East Tim- 
; orese resistance, and perhaps 
. revive the m ovem ent’s peace 
proposal. This calls, within a 
two-year period, for a ceasefire,
’ release of political prisoners 
and the reduction in num ber of 
Indonesian troops to 1,000. A 
referendum with independence 
as one option would be held 
after five years.
Finally, the prize highlights 
how East T im or is unfinished 
business from the period of 
decolonisation. It has turned 
the gravel in M r A latas’s shoe 
into a very large stone indeed. 
T here are some simple things 
his governm ent can do to 
remove it: stop the arbitrary 
arrests, detention and torture 
, of East Timorese; release polit­
ical prisoners, support on-site 
human rights monitoring by 
the UN, and start negotiations 
i with the East Tim orese resis- 
; ^ance, including Xanana Gus- 
.nao, backed by the UN.
Yet without more concerted 
action by the international eom- 
, munity, Indonesia is unlikely to 
, negotiate seriously before the 
,,Suharto regim e departs the 
stage. External pressure is a 
prerequisite for progress in the 
faltering peace talks. The best 
means available, recommended 
by the European Parliament, is 
to halt arms sales to Indonesia 
. now.T.J ;' ............
The' author is director o f the ' 
\ Catholic Institute fo r  Interna- 
.iio n a l Relations, 190a New  
: North Road, London N1 7BJ, 
which this week publishes 'East 
,Timor: The Continuing
RetrayaT. Island hero: Tim or's B ishop Carlos Filipe Belo
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Manila Bars Visit by Nobel Peace Laureate
The Associated Press
NiANILA —  The Philippine au­
thorities on M onday barred a w inner 
o f this year’s N obel Peace Prize, Jose 
R am os-H orta, from entering the 
country.
The ban stemmed from a directive 
by President Fidel Ramos denying 
entry to all foreigners who might dis­
rupt the Asia-Pacific Economic Co­
operation meeting, Immigration C om ­
missioner Edgar M endoza said.
“ W e have no choice but to ban 
H orta and other foreigners w hose 
presence here could endanger our na­
tional security ,’’ he said.
Mr. R am os-H orta is a roving em is­
sary o f the East T im or resistance 
m ovem ent, w hich opposes the In­
donesian m ilitary presence in the 
form er Portuguese colony. He was 
nam ed the jo in t w inner o f this year’s 
Peace Prize w ith the Rom an Catholic 
bishop of East T im or, Carlos Felipe 
X im enes Belo.
President Suharto o f Indonesia is 
am ong 18 leaders scheduled to attend 
the econom ic sum m it m eeting o f the 
organization, know n as A PEC, be­
ginning Nov. 25 in M anila.
Mr- Ramos-Horta had been sched­
uled to address the opening on NovT22 '
o f the People’s Forum on A PEC , a 
gathering ot 4UU delegates rrom the 
Philippines and other countries, in­
cluding the United States and Japan. 
i < The forum  opposes A PEC  s ef­
forts to establish free trade in the 
region, contending that such a policy 
w ould hurt poorer countries whose 
industries cannot com pete in the 
global market.
Indonesia invaded East T im or in 
1975 and annexed the territory in  
1976. H um an rights groups say In ­
donesian troops have tortured, beaten 
and killed civilians in a bid to stifle 
separatist aspirations.
Filipinos were divided on the ban 
on Mr. R am os-H orta.
The speaker o f the H ouse of-Rm -  
resentatives, Jose 3e Venecia, said 
that Mr. R am os-H ona was w elcom e 
to Vlsirthtt Philippines buThoTduring 
t)ie AhbL. m eeting:
“ in  respect to P resident Suharto, 
we are requesting he com e another 
tim e,”  Mr. de V enecia said.
J. V. Cruz, a colum nist in the in­
dependent M anila C hronicle new s­
paper and a form er diplom at, said Mr. 
R am os-H orta should stay away “ be­
cause his problem s w ith Indonesia 
are none of our business.”
F USA TODAY/lnternational Edition • FRIDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1996 ■ 5A
F O C U S  O N  A S I A  A N D  T H E  P A C I F I C
APEC critics denounce Philippines
By P»t Rorjuy, AP
Protesting A P EC : Demonstrators show their opposition to Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation during picketing in Manila.
Security moves 
for Nov. summit 
ignite firestorm
By Don Kirk 
Special for USA TODAY
MANILA — The Philippine govern­
ment's refusal to grant a visa to Nobel 
peace prize winner Jose Ramos-Horta 
is turning into a cause celebre among 
groups opposed to next month’s Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation summit
Critics including the nation’s Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference are protesting the 
exclusion of Ramos-Horta, co-winner of 
the prize along with Catholic Bishop 
Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo for their 
struggle for human rights for victims of 
Indonesian oppression in East Timor.
President Fidel Ramos, anxious for 
the APEC summit on Nov. 24-25 to 
showcase his country’s economic pro­
gress, included Ramos-Horta in a gener­
al ban on the entry “of any foreigner 
who . . .  may disturb these APEC meet­
ings and activities."
Ramos’ top security advisor, Jose Al­
monte, enraged APEC foes by declaring 
that Ramos-Horta "falls under that cate­
gory" and “our assessment is it will cause 





Those remarks reflect not only the 
fear of the government that its foes will 
jeopardize security but also Ramos' de­
sire not to embarrass Indonesian Presi­
dent Suharto, who might otherwise can­
cel plans to attend the summit 
Indonesia helped mediate talks that 
led to the signing of a peace accord be­
tween Manila and Muslim separatists.
Ramos insists it’s against "our nation­
al interest" to allow Ramos-Horta in the 
Philippines but denies his presence 
would threaten national security.
He admits, however, security con­
cerns, including the possibility that Is­
lamic terrorists may seek revenge for 
Philippine cooperation with the FBI in 
breaking up a Pakistani group linked to 
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
‘‘It is now acknowledged by Presid- 
net Clinton that the actions of the Philip­
pine government may have prevented
the bombing of at least 10 airliners be­
tween the United States and the Philip­
pines,” said Ramos.
Philippine bishops argue that Ramos- 
Horta, far from inspiring terrorist activ­
ities, would be a force for peace if he 
were able to visit the country during 
APEC. He was to have been the keynote 
speaker at one of several forums for 
APEC critics before the summit 
Monsignor Pedro Quitorio of the 
Catholic B ishops’ C onference, d e ­
nounced the ban as “anti-democratic,’’ 
but Almonte called Ramos-Horta “a po­
litical and security threat" 
Ramos-Horta, who lives in Sydney, 
said Re Rad “no intention of going to the 
Philippines to create a disturbance." 
Rather, he wanted “to engage in public 
forums to discuss a peace process with 
possible Philippine mediation.”
He told reporters in Australia he 
viewed the ban as “ silly” and was 
“amazed that an individual like me, with­
out an army and navy behind me, can be 
considered a potential disturbance.” 
Authorities in this often violent soci­
ety are taking no chances on security 
miscues at what they view as the biggest 
event in the country’s history since the 
People Power Revolution that drove 
President Ferdinand Marcos from pow­
er in February 1986. More than 50,000 
government troops reportedly are pa­
trolling the countryside around Subic 
Bay, the former U.S. Navy base, where
the 18 Asia and Pacific leaders, includ­
ing President Clinton, will hold some of 
their sessions.
So acute are security concerns that 
soldiers in some areas are forbidding 
farmers from harvesting their crops un­
til after the summit The government 
plans to issue special passes for anyone 
entering the city of Olongapo, surround­
ing the Subic Bay post now a special in­
dustrial zone with factories and offices 
in the former U.S. Navy facilities.
Authorities have already notified 
thousands of workers in Olongapo not 
to go to their jobs in shops, hotels and 
other establishments during the sum­
m it Instead, soldiers are being trained 
to replace them where needed.
The question of whether the govern­
ment is overdoing the security is a topic 
of front page headlines and commen­
taries in the national papers.
Rafael Mariano, organizer of one of 
the conferences critical of APEC, de­
crying the ban on harvesting during the 
summit, asked, “What would the gov­
ernment want the farmers to do with 
their produce — abandon them and 
wallow in hunger?”
He and other critics charge that the 
benefits of the economic gains under 
Ramos are not trickling down to most of 
the nation’s 70 million people.
The government does not ban such 
criticism, as long as the critics don’t get 
in the way of the summit participants.
